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The Cognitive Status of Risk:
A Response to Thompson*
L. James Valverde A., Jr.**
Introduction
The concept of risk has traditionally given rise to such questions as:
What is the nature of risk? Why is it practically useful to posit the notion
of risk? Is risk a fundamentally irreducible and unexplainable concept?
If it is not, how should we define risk? How should we think about risk
in the context of human experience? These are all questions relating to
what can collectively be referred to as the cognitive status of risk.1
In a recent essay,2 Paul Thompson provides some interesting and
thought-provoking perspectives on many of these questions. Central to
his analysis is the question, "When are risks real?" In answering this
question, Professor Thompson challenges two basic tenets of
contemporary risk analysis. The first of these tenets is the philosophical
view that risk is fundamentally an epistemic category that is grounded in
empiricism - a view that Thompson labels probabilistic. The second
* This paper was written during the author's tenure as Senior Research Associate
at the Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. The author thanks John
Kadvany, D. Warner North, Mario Rabinowitz, Jennie Rice and Bruce Tonn for their
insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.
** Technology and Policy Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA.
1 For the purposes of this discussion, I draw a somewhat informal distinction
between the cognitive status of risk and the psychology of risk, where the latter is
concerned mainly with how people react to and perceive uncertainty, and the former is
concerned with the mental processes that are associated with our conceptualization
and understanding of risk.
2 Thompson, Risk Objectivism and Risk Subjectivism: When are Risks Real?, 1
RISK: ISSUEsIN HEALTHAND SAFETY 3 (1990).
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tenet concerns the role of probability theory in risk analysis. With regard
to each of these tenets, Thompson argues that probabilistic conceptions
of risk are fundamentally inadequate for understanding and reasoning
about risk. In what follows, I shall be concerned with examining the
various arguments that Thompson puts forth in defense of this claim.
From the onset, it is important to note that while the notion of risk
has historically taken on a number of different interpretations, it has
almost always been defined in terms of loss and uncertainty.3 In
classical decision theory, e.g., the word "risk" describes the situation
where both the possible states of nature and the probabilities associated
with these states are known. Although this view departs somewhat from
the way the word is used in most risk analysis contexts, where
probabilities are often unknown, it does accurately convey the above
connotation. It is, I think, reasonable to affirm that our modem
conception of risk does, in fact, conjoin the common sense notion of
loss with that of uncertainty. In an earlier essay,4 Thompson accepts
this general conception of risk, and proposes the following definitions
for real, observed, and perceived risk:
Real Risk. The combination of chance and negative
consequence that exists in the real world.
Observed Risk. The evaluation of the combination of
chance aid negative consequence as measured by a
theoretical model of the physical world.
Perceived Risk. The estimate of real risk made in the
absence of a theoretical model of the physical world.
Using these definitions, Thompson distinguishes between erroneous
analysis and erroneous judgment, where the former represents the
difference between real and observed risk, and the latter represents the
difference between real and perceived risk.5
3 W. D. ROWE, AN ANATOMY OF RISK (1977) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF RISK].
4 Thompson, The Philosophical Foundations of Risk, 24 S. J. PHIL. 273 (1986)
[hereinafter Philosophical Foundations of Risk].
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What is interesting to note about Thompson's definitions is that his
notion of "real risk" immediately leads us to some difficult philosophical
and methodological questions, many of which are, at bottom, questions
that ultimately reduce to metaphysical disputes about realism and
antirealism. As I will show below, Thompson's philosophical
inclination is to view risk as a formal, abstract object. This brand of risk
realism, I will argue, is plagued by a number of conceptual and
pragmatic difficulties, many of which are not easily cast aside. Central
to my analysis is the view that by positing the notion of "real risk,"
Thompson is, in effect, affirming the possibility of certain knowledge.
This is shown to have undesirable consequences for the theory and
practice of risk analysis, the most important of which is that it
promulgates the view that there exist exact or certain values to which
we should strive for in our analyses.
I want to address four main issues in response to Thompson's
essay. In the next section, I begin by considering the conceptual
distinction that is drawn between actual and perceived risk. Here, I
relate various philosophical issues concerning the interpretation of
scientific theories to questions concerning the potential reality of risks.
As part of this discussion, I put forth both realist and antirealist
conceptions of risk, and I examine these risk paradigms in the context of
Thompson's analysis. This is then followed by a discussion of the
cognitive objectives of risk analysis, and a discussion of how the results
of such analyses should be interpreted in light of these objectives. In the
section that follows, I examine the role of the principle of causality in
modem risk analysis, with particular emphasis on Thompson's use of
5 In AN ANATOMY OF RISK, William Rowe uses the term descriptive uncertainty
in roughly the same way that Thompson uses the term erroneous analysis, and
observes that "it is an underlying precept of scientific positivism that it should be
possible to discover all natural law. This implies that the descriptive uncertainty of
the universe can be reduced to a value approaching zero." ANATOMY OF RISK, supra
note 3, at 20.
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the principle in answering the question, "when are risks real?" Here, I
identify various features of Thompson's causal answer, and I argue that
causality is fundamentally probabilistic in character. In the next section,
I take up the issue of the role of probability in risk analysis. The section
begins with a brief discussion of the meaning of probability statements.
As part of this discussion, I look historically at the conceptual evolution
of the frequentist and subjectivist views of probability. I then consider
various aspects of the nature of objectivity and subjectivity in risk
analysis, with particular emphasis on the sharp distinction that
Thompson draws between risk objectivism and risk subjectivism. The
paper concludes with an assessment of the degree to which the
traditional debate between Bayesians and frequentists is relevant to the
theory and practice of risk analysis.
Real Risk and Perceived Risk
The distinction that is drawn between actual and perceived risk is a
pervasive theme in risk analysis. In principle, the distinction between
the two concepts lies in the assumption or belief that actual or, as I will
call it, real risk is a measure of how things stand in the world, whereas
perceived risk is judgmental in nature, and does not necessarily coincide
with reality.
At first glance, the distinction between real and perceived risk seems
reasonable, in that reality and perception are not always conjoined.
Thompson argues that the conceptual dichotomy between these two
views of risk is founded on the philosophical premise that risk is a
reality that is somehow discernible from empirical inquiry. Real risk,
Thompson says, "is the object of natural science inquiry," whereas
perceived risk "is the object of social science inquiry." 6 ,7 In this
6 Thompson, supra note 2, at 7.
7 The role that natural science inquiry plays in the analysis of risk needs, here, to
be distinguished from views that construe "real" risk as the privileged concern of
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way, risk is seen as a matter of how things stand in the world.
Insofar as science is taken to be a process by which man attempts to
explain or describe how things actually stand in the world, the degree to
which risk statements can be taken to be statements about reality is a
question of both philosophical and methodological importance. A central
question we face in this regard is to what extent is it reasonable to
enquire as to the "reality" of risk(s), and, moreover, how do our
interpretations or views of science and scientific theories influence the
way we approach the question, "when are risks real?" These are two
questions to which I now turn.
The Interpretation of Scientific Theories
The interpretation of scientific theories has long been the subject of
considerable debate among philosophers and scientists, alike. Central to
much of this debate is the question of whether scientific theories should,
or in fact can, be interpreted as true or false statements.8 While it is
beyond the scope of this essay to provide a thorough discussion of the
body of work that addresses this question, it is worth considering how
some of these ideas relate to the cognitive status of risk.
Realism and antirealism
In its simplest form, scientific realism assumes that physical reality
is independent of man's existence. In this way, science not only
produces predictions, but also describes the true nature of things.
Antirealism, on the other hand, denies that science describes anything
"real" at all, but instead serves as a logical instrument for prediction and
science. Such views are markedly positivistic in that they affirm that science is the
only valid-source of knowledge about risk(s). It is, I think, fair to say that such
modes of thought promote an intellectual arrogance that not only belies the fallibility
of human knowledge, but also obfuscates the fact that science is not the only source
of reliable knowledge. At most, positivistic conceptions of risk succeed only in
impeding meaningful dialogue between the lay public and the scientific community
in matters of risk and human safety.
8 E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF ScIENcE (2d ed. 1979).
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control. In a particularly lucid analysis of the concept of truth, Paul
Horwich summarizes the philosophical bases for these two opposing
views as follows:9
[T]here can seem to be a tension in ordinary thinking
between the metaphysical autonomy of the world (its
independence of us) and its epistemological accessibility (our
capacity to find out about it). The difference between a realist
and an antirealist ... is that the realist decides ... that there is
actually no difficulty here ... whereas the antirealist decides,
on the contrary, that the alleged conflict is genuine and that it
has certain ramifications for what we can take ourselves to
know.
Given these two views, we can, in a similar fashion, outline both
realist and antirealist conceptions of risk. For the purposes of this
discussion, we will denote these two views of risk by riskr and riska,
respectively. A realist conception of risk affirms that risk is something
that is intrinsically independent of human knowledge. In this way, riskr
describes the view that in the world there are relatively isolated
activities, objects, or phenomena that pose a potential threat to human
health and safety; as an endeavor that is, insofar as possible, grounded
in science, risk analysis is a process that is capable of identifying and
describing them. Alternatively, riska describes the view that risk is not
independent of human knowledge, and is fundamentally an epistemic
category that serves as an organizing principle whereby empirical
statements concerning matters of human health and safety are analyzed
with respect to a conceptual framework of interpretation.
The notion that "reality" and "truth" are semantically linked is a
pervasive theme in the history of philosophy and philosophy of
science. 10 Our inquiry into the potential reality of risks can easily be
thought of in these terms. With regard to the two opposing views of
9 P. HORWiCH, TRUTH 57 (1990).
10 Id.
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risk, riskr describes the view that risk statements are, in fact, statements
about reality, and are therefore appropriately characterized as being
either true or false. Alternatively, riska describes the view that risk
statements are not premises from which factual conclusions are
deduced, and are therefore not appropriately characterized as being
either true or false. 1
. It is possible to retreat somewhat from the realist and antirealist
conceptions of risk that riskr and riska represent. If we suppose, as
Thompson does, that risks are either real or they aren't, then, as he puts
it, "we are obligated to act upon the true facts, so far as we can tell
what they are." 12 From this vantage point, we can assert that our
belief in the truth or reality of a particular risk statement is enhanced
when the statement is supported by empirical evidence. In this way, risk
statements are viewed as means of representing relations of dependence
between observable events and properties. Moreover, according to this
view, questions as to the truth or falsity of risk statements are
characterized as such only insofar as the assertability of these statements
is translatable into matters of observation and testability. 13
Thompson's risk realism
Thompson's inclination towards a realist conception of risk is
evident in the following quote: 14
To the extent that risk analysis is committed to the general
concept of nature as a sphere of things and events, existing
independently of and largely unaffected by our attempts to
know it, the characterization of risk in terms of chance and
negativity ... appears to be appropriate.
The idea that risk is independent of human knowledge is also one
that Thompson holds out as being important in answering the question,
11 NAGEL, supra note 8.
12 Thompson, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasis added).
13 NAGEL, supra note 8.
14 Philosophical Foundations of Risk, supra note 4, at 285 (emphasis added).
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"When are risks real? ' 15 As he puts it:16
Part of the motivation for positing a notion of real risk,
distinct from perception, is to describe the situation in
which we run risks of which we are unaware, even,
perhaps, could not have been aware.
From the two passages above, it is readily apparent that
Thompson's philosophical inclination is to view risk as a formal,
abstract object. The position he takes is markedly platonistic, in that it
holds that risk is fundamentally independent of human knowledge.
Platonism, as a distinct and discernible mode of thought, occupies an
important position in the history of Western thought, and has, in many
respects, influenced the development and advancement of science. An
extreme platonist view of risk, however, construes "real risk" or, riskr ,
as an abstract entity that is neither spatio-temporal nor causally
interacting with the physical world. 17 Such an extreme view seems to
run counter to almost every common sense conception of risk, and,
moreover, leaves open the fundamental question of how we learn and
attain knowledge about risks.
While I do not believe that Thompson is necessarily advocating an
extreme platonist view of risk, there are some philosophical and
methodological problems associated with the notion of risk realism that
merit further consideration. First, by positing the notion of real risk,
Thompson is essentially affirming that risk statements have truth values
that are somehow independent of the theories that such statements are
15 This point has been made before in the literature. N. RESCHER, (RISK: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCIIONTO THE THEORY OF RISK EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT
(1983)), for example, makes an interesting distinction between taking a risk and
running a risk, where risk taking describes the situationwhere an agent mindfully
selects a particular course of action, and running a risk describes the situation where a
risk exists, but is not necessarily known by the agent.
16 Thompson, supra note 2, at 20 (emphasis added).
17 A. FLEW, A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 1979); H. Putnam, Models and
Reality, in PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS: SELECTED READINGS 421-444 (P.
Benacerraf & H. Putnam eds. 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter Models and Reality].
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invariably made relative to. Among the more problematic features of this
view is that, in principle, it ascribes what Iilary Putnam 18 has called
"nonnatural mental powers" to our capacity as human beings to grasp
and understand abstract entities.
Putting aside, for the moment, Thompson's implicit appeal to
mysterious mental faculties, let us briefly consider some of the
consequences of adopting a sharp philosophical distinction between real
and observed risk. Suppose, for the purposes of this discussion, that
real risk and perceived risk lie at opposite ends of a continuum, and that
observed risk lies somewhere in between these two extremes. In
assessing or estimating observed risk, an obvious desideratum is to lie
as close on this continuum to real risk as possible. Naturally, each
incremental step we make towards real risk is, in effect, a better and
better representation of reality. A reasonable cognitive objective in
assessing observed risk, then, is to minimize the absolute difference
between real and observed risk.
The prima facie plausibility of this view notwithstanding, there are,
of course, a number of methodological problems associated with it. The
most difficult of these problems was mentioned above, namely, the
implicit appeal to nonnatural mental powers for learning and acquiring
knowledge about real risks. In the absence of such powers, how are we
to ascertain where we lie on the continuum? Moreover, how are we to
know if, or when, real risk and observed risk coincide? Naturally, these
are difficult questions for which there are no hard and fast answers. 19
Considerations such as these suggest that the notion of real risk is
18 Models and Reality, supra note 17.
19 Putnam summarizes the problem in the following way: "It may well be the case
that the idea that statements have their truth values independent of embedding theory
is so deeply built into our ways of talking that there is simply no 'ordinary language'
word or short phrase which refers to the theory-dependence of meaning and truth."
Models and Reality, supra note 17, at 430 (emphasis in original).
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plagued by a number of conceptual and pragmatic difficulties, many of
which are not easily overcome. By positing riskr, we are, in effect,
affirming the possibility of certain knowledge. In particular, we
promulgate the view that there exist exact or certain values of risk to
which we should strive for in our analyses. This position is, I think,
fundamentally misguided, and has been seriously challenged by modem
philosophers on a number of fronts.2 0
We are forced to conclude that the merits of adopting a strict sense
of the notion of real risk must be judged in terms of the cognitive
objectives of risk analysis. One can argue, e.g., that risk realism can
serve as a maxim for risk analysis inquiry. Viewed in this way, riskr is
construed as an ideal to which we should strive for (but perhaps never
achieve) in our analyses. Accordingly, the risk realism paradigm can
have a potentially positive influence upon our efforts to achieve the
cognitive objectives of risk analysis, and may even give rise to strategies
for research and understanding. As I have argued, however, these
potential benefits do not come without certain costs. Most important in
this regard is the view that it is fundamentally unreasonable philosophy
to posit the existence of exact values to which we should strive for in
our analyses of risk. Such a view of risk, I will argue below, is rigidly
linked to that of determinism, and fails to place in perspective the fact
that our search for complete certainty in matters of risk and human
safety is, both in principle and in practice, fundamentally unachievable.
Cognitive Objectives
Having considered how the interpretation of scientific theories can
influence the way we approach the question "When are risks real?", we
now turn our attention to the question of what relevance these ideas have
to the analysis of risk. In particular, we address two basic questions: (1)
What are the cognitive objectives of risk analysis? and (2) How should
20 See, e.g., P. SUPPES, PROBABILISTIC METAPHYSICS (1984).
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risk statements be interpreted in light of these objectives?
In the introduction of this essay I posed the following question:
Why is it practically useful to posit the notion of risk? The principal
motivation for positing the notion of risk is, I think, self-evident: to help
man cope with an ever-changing and uncertain environment. Long
before the rise of modem civilization, man sought to obtain reliable
knowledge and information about his environment. This desire for
control was, of course, motivated by a primal desire for survival.
Obviously, this desire for survival and increased quality of life has, in
turn, given rise to the notion of risk. In this way, the notion of risk is
derived from common sense reasoning, and arose from the pragmatic
concerns of everyday life.
Naturally, the pragmatic concerns of daily living require that we go
beyond just abstract, generalized conceptions of risk. Accordingly, it is
reasonable to assert that risk is best viewed as a fundamental concept
whose raison d'etre is to motivate certain lines of inquiry whose
purpose is prediction and control. In this way, risk analysis can be
construed as a structured process that seeks to arrive at predictively
informative assertions about possible events which, should they
transpire, could pose a potential threat to human health and safety.
If we accept the basic premise that prediction and control are the
fundamental objectives of risk analysis, then how should risk statements
be interpreted and used in light of these objectives? While it is beyond
the scope of this essay to provide a detailed response to this question, it
is useful to consider two views that seem particularly relevant to the
present discussion, namely, the philosophical concepts of fallibilism
and falsifiability.
Fallibilism
Fallibilism describes the philosophical view that the conclusions of
scientific inquiry are always subject to question. Such a view as applied
to risk analysis is appealing in that it does not seek to make the answers,
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explanations, or predictions of such analyses final. As a matter of
reasonable philosophy and practice, the results of risk analyses should
be presented in such a way as to leave open the possibility that new
evidence could arise that would call into question the validity or
legitimacy of prior analyses. This view has long been advocated by
social scientists and policy makers, alike.21
The reasonableness of a fallibilistic view of risk becomes readily
apparent when we consider a simple model of the dynamics of how we
learn and acquire knowledge about risks. At any one time, our
knowledge and information about a particular risk statement, call it R,
can be characterized in one of the following three ways:22
R is accepted;
R is rejected;
R is indetermnined, thus neither accepted nor rejected.
Our acceptance, rejection, or indetermination of R is based upon the
evaluation of the evidence that is available to us. How we actually
choose to evaluate R in light of this evidence is not important here. What
is important to note is that a fallibilistic view of risk does not view any
one of these three possible states as being absorbing in character. By
this I mean, e.g., that R's acceptance does not preclude the possibility
that new evidence could arise that ultimately leads us to reject or
suspend judgment on R. This position essentially amounts to a belief
that no amount of evidence is ever viewed as providing an infallible
argument for the acceptance, rejection, or indetermination of a particular
risk statement. Naturally, a fallibilistic view of risk allows us to leave
open the possibility that some risks may not even be known to us.
21 In discussing the value-laden nature of risk analysis, Rowe, for example, notes
that the results of risk analyses "are often expressed in explicit, objective terms that
belie the subjectivity of the value judgements employed in arriving at them."
ANATOMYOF RISK, supra note 3, at 4.
22 I. LEvI GAMBLING WTh TRuT (1967).
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Falsifiability
The concept of falsifiability, which is due to Karl Popper,2 3 is
closely related to that of fallibilism. This view affirms that scientific
knowledge is always open to question, and that no theory is ever
conclusively verified. In the context of risk analysis, falsifiable risk
statements are desirable ends in themselves, in that critical analysis is
always in force, and, because of this, there is never any one claim to
ultimate truth or reality.
The Causal Answer
The principle of causality plays an important role in Thompson's
approach to the question, "When are risks real?" Risks are real, says
Professor Thompson, "when there is sufficient reason to suspect the
presence of a causal sequence that would produce [an] unwanted event."
Thompson calls this the causal answer. A salient feature of the causal
answer, Thompson says, is that it is "nontechnical" and "can be
understood by any competent adult."24 What is it that makes the causal
answer, as stated, nontechnical? As I see it, what makes it so is that it
fails to address two fundamental questions. First, it says nothing about
the semantic interpretation of the linguistic entities cause and effect,
i.e., how do these linguistic entities come together to form what, in
ordinary language, we call a causal relation? Second, the causal answer
does not provide an account of what kind of logical relation or operator
is associated with, or attributed to, these causal entities.2 5
Consequently, Thompson's causal answer addresses neither the nature
nor the structure of causality.
23 K. POPPER, THE LOGICOP SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959).
24 Thompson, supra note 2, at 12.
25 Domotor, Causal Models and Space-Time Geometries, in SPACE, TIME, AND
GEOMEIRY (P. Suppes ed. 1973).
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In principle, causal theories are instruments of explanation and
prediction. As such, they play a central role in achieving the cognitive
objectives of risk analysis. 26 Thompson's causal answer, however,
lacks a relational structure between ordinary experience and what it says
constitutes a "real" risk. As such, Thompson's causal answer is
predictively uninformative, and therefore plays little more than a
minimal role in achieving the cognitive objectives of risk analysis.
In what follows I argue that causality is fundamentally probabilistic
in character, and that, because of this, Thompson's causal answer is
more appropriately characterized as a probabilistic causal answer.
Causality and the Humeian Tradition
The principle of causality is an essential element of both common
sense and scientific reasoning. In discussing the causal answer,
Thompson rightly notes that the conceptual evolution of causality has
been both difficult and problematic. If we examine the combined
histories of philosophy and science, starting with the classical views of
Aristotle, and ending with the empiricist philosophy of Hume, it
becomes readily apparent that, in a particular epoch, the meaning
ascribed to the principle of causality has closely paralleled that of the
prevailing physical paradigm. Naturally, our view of the world
influences, to a large extent, the way we approach the question of
causality. It is not surprising, then, that much of the history of
philosophical thinking about causality is deeply rooted in the
determinism of classical Newtonian physics. And despite the fact that in
this century the rise of quantum mechanics has lead to dramatic (in fact,
revolutionary) transformations in the way we think and reason about the
physical world, the determinism of classical physics is still very much a
part of our prevailing world view.
26 Valverde A., Jr., Probabilistic Causality and its Applications to Risk Analysis,
in THE ANALYSIS, COMMUNICATION, AND PERCEPTION OF RISK, 9 ADvANcEs IN RISK
ANALYSIS (1991).
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The determinism of the Newtonian paradigm dominates much of
David Hume's 27 famous analysis of causality. In his analysis, the
relation between cause and effect is said to possess three distinct
characteristics: (i) continuity; (ii) succession in time; and (iii) constant
conjunction. This view has dominated much of the history of
philosophical thinking about causality.28
In modem accounts of causation,2 9 a major point of contention
with the Humeian analysis lies with requirement (iii). Specifically, the
supposition that effects follow their causes in a constant fashion does
not always agree with experience, and furthermore, presupposes that
every event must have a fully determinant cause.3 0 Many modern
philosophers have also questioned the appropriateness of deterministic
accounts of causality on the basis that they depart sharply with how
causal notions are utilized in ordinary language.
Given these objections, what philosophers have sought to arrive at
in recent decades is a conception or definition of causality that serves the
scientific purposes to which the everyday notion is put. To this end,
modem analyses have extended the Humeian position by viewing the
connection between cause and effect as being fundamentally
probabilistic in nature.
In discussing the possible role of probability in the causal answer,
Thompson notes that if "causality is nothing more than 'constant
conjunction,' as Hume thought, perhaps we would do better to replace
27 D.HUME,ATREATSEON HUMANNATURE (1888).
28 P. SUPPES, supra note 20.
29 See, e.g., PROBABiLITY AND CAUSALITY (J. Fetzer ed. 1988); I. J. Good, GOOD
THINKING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY AND ITS APPLICATIONS (1983)
[hereinafter GOOD TINKING]; Suppes, A Probabilistic Theory of Causality, 24
ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA (1970); and P. SUPPES, supra note 20.
30 Patrick Suppes, for example, notes that "if we replaced constant conjunction by
frequent conjunction, we would get something that would be more faithful to the
facts and that would do little violence to Hume's analysis." Supra note 20, at 39.
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the concept with a notion of statistical correlation." 3 1 As I have already
said, the prevailing conception of causality is that it is, in fact, more than
just constant conjunction. Moreover, it is, I think, well understood that
perfect statistical correlation does not necessarily imply a valid causal
relationship; correlation is only one means by which to identify valid
causal relationships. 32
Conceptually, it is important to recognize that a probabilistic view of
causality is robust in that, in the limiting case, it is possible to define
sufficient or determinate causes that produce their effects with
probability one. Probabilistic causality, therefore, encompasses the
deterministic view of causality as a special case. For this reason, when
Thompson speaks of "replacing" the causal answer with a probabilistic
one, he seems to lose sight of an important philosophical and conceptual
distinction. Unless he is suggesting that the underlying metaphysical
foundation for the causal answer is the assumption or belief that every
event has a sufficient determinant cause, then the issue is not whether
we should replace the causal answer with one grounded in probabilistic
terms, but rather that, in the absence of such a deterministic view, the
causal answer is, in fact, probabilistic in character.33
In consequence, Thompson's causal answer is, it seems to me,
more appropriately characterized as a probabilistic causal answer,
which can be summarized as follows:
Probabilistic Causal Answer. Risks are real when there is
31 Thompson, supra note 2, at 13.
32 Ian Hacking, in discussing causalism, rightly notes that "good Humeians know
there must be more than mere correlation." I. HACKING, REPRESENTING AND
INTERVENG 35 (1983).
33 I. J. Good takes a somewhat different route in arriving at basically the same
conclusion: "If the world is deterministic then probabilistic causality does not exist,
but we'll never know with certainty whether determinism or indeterminism is true.
So it is legitimate to assume indeterminism even if it is only a convenient fiction,
somewhat like using the axiom of choice in a mathematical proof." GOOD THKiNG,
supra note 29, at 393.
Valverde: The Cognitive Status of Risk 329
sufficient reason to believe that there exists a causal sequence
that, with high probability, could produce an unwanted
event.
The probabilistic causal answer allows us to responsibly represent those
cases where the risks in question can not be explained in certain and
unambiguous terms. Naturally, the higher the probability of a delineated
causal sequence, the more real and present the risk to human health and
safety becomes. Thompson seems to acknowledge the inevitability of
such an approach to the causal answer when he distinguishes between
(1) causal sequences that are possible but unlikely, and (2) causal
sequences that suggest a real and present danger.34
The Role of Probability in Risk Analysis
Probability theory plays a central role in our modem conception of
risk. It is interesting to note, however, that the use of probability for the
analysis and management of risk has had a curious and somewhat varied
history. This is due, in part, to a lack of agreement among risk analysts
as to the nature of the relation between probability and risk. In addition,
the interpretation of probability has often been viewed as an important
issue in the foundations of risk theory. In the latter half of his essay,
Thompson discusses the role of probability in risk analysis, with
particular emphasis on the two well-known interpretations of
probability: the frequentist interpretation and the subjectivist, or
Bayesian, interpretation. Inasmuch as these two competing views are
applied in risk analysis, Thompson draws a distinction between risk
objectivism and risk subjectivism, which construe risk as a function of
relative frequency and confidence, respectively. Thompson considers
each of these views from both philosophical and pragmatic vantage
points, and concludes that probability theory is fundamentally
inadequate for understanding and reasoning about risk.
34 Thompson, supra note 2, at 12-13.
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In this section, I consider some of Thompson's critical remarks on
these issues. My remarks are organized as follows. I begin by
considering the meaning of probability statements. As part of this
discussion, I look historically at the conceptual evolution of the
frequentist and subjectivist views of probability. I then consider various
aspects of the nature of objectivity and subjectivity in risk analysis, with
particular emphasis on the sharp distinction that Thompson draws
between risk objectivism and risk subjectivism. Lastly, I consider the
degree to which the traditional debate between frequentists and
subjectivists is relevant to modem risk analysis, and I argue for a
pluralistic view of the role of probability in risk analysis.
The Meaning of Probability
Probability theory dates as far back as the seventeenth century,
where it had its inception in the analysis of games of chance.
Historically, the conceptual evolution of probability has been anything
but unproblematic. The largely philosophical debates as to the "correct"
interpretation of probability are7 traditionally divided between two
schools of thought: the frequentist interpretation and the subjectivist,
or Bayesian, interpretation. The frequentist interpretation corresponds
to our notion of probability as a relative frequency. 35 Alternatively, the
Bayesian interpretation views the probability of an event as a subjective
degree of belief, which takes into account all relevant knowledge and
information.
For the better part of the twentieth century, the conceptual
differences separating the Bayesian and frequentist views have been the
35 Let S denote a sample space, and let C be some subset of S. If we perform an
experiment and the outcome is an element of C, then we say that the event C has
occurred. Suppose that we perform the random experiment N times, and the event C
occurs a total of f times throughout the N performances. The ratio f/N is called the
relative frequency of the event C in these N experiments. R. V. HOGG & A. T.
CRVAiG, INTRODUCION To MATHEMATICAL STATISTCS (4th ed. 1978).
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subject of long and (mostly) inconclusive debate. Early in this century,
the frequentist view prevailed as the dominant paradigm, with R. A.
Fisher 36 and J. Neyman 37 as central proponents. However, as
statistics began to play a more prominent role in scientific inquiry, the
limitations of the frequentist approach to probability became increasingly
apparent, especially in contexts where scarce data was available. In the
1950's, the seminal work of Leonard Savage38 and his colleagues laid
the necessary foundations for the subjectivist viewpoint, and provided
the conceptual means by which to use probabilities in the absence of
data. By the 1970's, the frequentist conception of probability was no
longer viewed as the only reasonable interpretation of probability.
Historically, the traditional debate between Bayesians and
frequentists has taken a number of different guises. Not surprisingly,
Bayesians disagree variedly among themselves, 39 as do frequentists.
For this reason, it is not entirely correct to speak of Bayesians, qua
Bayesians, and frequentists, qua frequentists. For the purposes of this
discussion, however, it is useful to consider two notions that, on the
surface, seem to separate these views, namely, objectivity and
subjectivity.
Objectivity and Subjectivity in Risk Analysis
The interpretation of probability statements has traditionally been
viewed as an important issue in the definition of risk. One reason for
this is that the notions of objectivity and subjectivity play different roles
in our usual conceptions of risk. For example, on the one hand, we
36 R. A. FISHER, CONTIBUTIONS TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS (1950); Fisher,
Statistical Methods and Scientific Induction, 17 J. STATISTICAL SOc'Y, SERIES B 69
(1955).
37 j. NEYMAN, A SELECiION OF EARLY STATISTICAL PAPERS OF J. NEYMAN (1967).
38 Savage, The Foundations of Statistics Reconsidered (1961), in READINGS IN
UNCERTAIN REASONING (G. Shafer & J. Pearl eds. 1990).
39 Good has determined (albeit somewhat wittily) that there are 46,656 varieties of
Bayesians; GOOD THINKING, supra note 20, at 20-21.
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want to be as "objective" as possible in assessing or estimating risk. On
the other hand, we recognize that what one person considers "risky"
may not be considered so by another. In some respects, then, the
notions of objectivity and subjectivity are intermeshed in our everyday
conceptions of risk. This duality of sorts has had important implications
for the ways in which probability theory has been applied in risk
analysis.
Risk objectivism
Risk objectivism construes risk as solely a function of relative
frequency. The objections that Thompson raises against this view are
essentially the same as those that have traditionally been raised against
the frequentist view of probability. For example, a common objection
concerns the problems that are associated with the direct measurement of
repeated trials. In some cases, it may be difficult, costly, or even
impossible to perform repeated measurements, thereby putting in
question the meaningfulness of relative frequency probabilities so
derived. Moreover, in those cases where frequency data is available, it
may not be representative. These methodological problems, Thompson
argues, make it difficult to adopt a conception of risk that is based solely
on a frequentist view of probability. An important issue that Thompson
fails to address in this particular discussion is the manner in which new
evidence is incorporated into our probability assignments. As Savage40
and others have argued, once a strong frequentist position is adopted, it
is not possible to introduce new evidence into our probability
assessment. I will not dwell here on the technical details surrounding
this specific issue; I only point out, as Thompson does, that
philosophical and methodological difficulties such as these have led
many risk analysts to abandon a (strong) frequentist conception of risk.
40 Supra note 38.
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Risk subjectivism
Risk subjectivism construes risk as solely a function of confidence
or subjective belief. In his discussion, Thompson rightly notes that this
view has been widely adopted by the risk community in favor of risk
objectivism. This is due, in part, to the fact that it seems to eliminate
some of the difficulties associated with the frequentist view. As
Thompson points out, "an important proportion of our concern about
risk arises from the possibility of events to which we cannot assign
meaningful [frequentist] probabilities." 41
In his analysis of risk subjectivism, Thompson puts forth a number
of criticisms against the use of subjective probability in risk analysis. A
major problem with risk subjectivism, he says, is that the "Bayesian
decision maker's estimate of risk can never be wrong." And while
probabilities should be revised in light of new evidence or information,
such information does not in any way "invalidate" the prior probability
assignment. For these reasons, Thompson concludes that "there can be
no possibility of error in the subjectivist account of risk."42
I have two observations to make with regard to this series of
comments. First, Thompson's comments presuppose that there are such
things as "right" or "wrong" risk estimates. As I mentioned earlier, this
view is difficult to defend on a number of counts, not the least of which
is that it presupposes a deterministic view of the world.
Second, Thompson seems to fundamentally misstate the Bayesian
position. At the heart of Bayesian theory is the concept of induction,
i.e., how beliefs change in light of new evidence or observations.
Bayesian conditionalization, in general, and Bayes' rule, in particular,
are normative rules for updating probabilities in light of new
information. As such, the claim that. Bayesian updating somehow
41 Thompson, supra note 2, at 25.
42 Id. at 20-21.
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"invalidates" prior probability assignments is fundamentally at odds
with the concept of belief revision, which, I think it fair to say, is not
only the cornerstone of Bayesian theory, but is also the basis of most
accepted precepts of rational thinking.
As Thompson's remarks demonstrate, the dynamics of belief
revision is often a source of misconception. In many real-world
applications, probabilities change or evolve over time; they are neither
constant nor fixed. When viewed in this way, new or updated
probabilities are not necessarily "better" than the old probabilities. How
we ultimately define "better" is an entirely subjective matter. In this
respect, it is possible to define rationality criteria, e.g., logical
consistency and probabilistic coherence, relative to which we can make
value judgments of this sort. If, e.g., we adopt the concept of coherency
as a rationality criteria, then we can make the following sorts of
statements: "A coherent set of beliefs is preferable to an incoherent set of
beliefs." Only in the context of such criteria can we reasonably assert
that one set of beliefs is "better" than another.
Thompson's motivation, it seems, in putting forth this view is to
leave open the possibility of error in probabilistic risk estimation; this, in
and of itself, is not an all together unreasonable desideratum.
Unfortunately, his criticisms of the Bayesian view end up having the
exact opposite effect. The reason for this is simple: If we do not use
Bayesian conditionalization to introduce new evidence, then, by
Thompson's account, we fail to "invalidate" our prior estimate. In this
way, we can never be "wrong." The inadequacy of such a view is, of
course, self evident.
The hinterland between objectivism and subjectivism
The notions of objectivity and subjectivity have been essential
elements of the traditional debate between Bayesians and frequentists.
The reasons for this are many. First, the notion of objectivity has
historically occupied an honorific position in modem science. The lure
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of "scientific objectivity" has therefore been something that most
statisticians have not found easy to cast aside. In seeming opposition to
this view, however, most statisticians agree that largely subjective
intuition plays an equally important role in most aspects of scientific
inquiry.
In the context of the traditional debate, it is important to recognize,
as Efron43 and others have argued, that there is no a priori reason to
suppose that objectivity must be thought of in frequentist terms.
Observations such as these naturally lead us to conclude that there are
good reasons to suppose that the hinterland separating objectivity and
subjectivity is not as clearly defined as is sometimes thought. This, in
turn, leads us to question the relevance of the traditional debate between
Bayesians and frequentists.
To What Extent is the Traditional Debate Relevant?
Writing three decades ago, Savage had the following to say about
the traditional debate between Bayesians and frequentists:44
[A] problem which after so many years still resists solution
is suspect of being ill formulated, especially since this is a
problem of conceptualization, not a technical mathematical
problem....
The fact that Savage's remark still rings true today leads us to the
following basic question: To what extent is the traditional debate
relevant to the foundations and practice of risk analysis?
In general terms, there are at least three reasons to believe that the
traditional debate between Bayesians and frequentists is not as relevant
to risk analysis as is sometimes thought. The first reason is that, on the
whole, there is generally more agreement among Bayesians and
frequentists than is usually acknowledged. Most Bayesians, e.g., agree
43. Efron, Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian, in READINGS IN UNCERTAIN REASONING
(G. Shafer & J. Pearl, eds. 1990).
44 Supra note 38, at 15.
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that their goal is to estimate objective probabilities from fiequency data.
Frequentists, naturally, rely on frequency data, while Bayesians, on the
other hand, advocate using subjective prior probabilities to improve the
estimates. In a similar fashion, objective Bayesians attribute
nonfrequentist, but objective, interpretations to prior probabilities. We
see, then, that in some respects it is reasonable to assert that the rift that
is said to divide these two camps is not as large as is sometimes
thought.
The second reason is that, given the individual successes that the
Bayesian and frequentist paradigms have been able to claim, it is
patently unreasonable to suppose that one of these paradigms will
someday be abandoned at the expense of the other. In the past decade,
e.g., Bayesian probability theory has gained increased acceptance and
prominence, due, in part, to its successful application in fields such as
artificial intelligence and decision analysis. Similarly, frequentist
statistics occupies an important position in many aspects of scientific
inquiry. In the analysis of large and messy data, e.g., frequentist
methods have proved to be invaluable tools for practicing scientists and
engineers. Given this state of affairs, what seems to be the most likely
result of the traditional debate is some sort of Bayes/non-Bayes
compromise. Such a compromise would, in principle, serve as the basis
for a unified view of probability.45
The third reason for de-emphasizing the relevance of the traditional
debate between Bayesians and frequentists is that reasonable arguments
can be made for adopting an instrumentalist view of both paradigms,
thereby conceding that for certain problems, one paradigm may be
preferable- to another. From this vantage point, the Bayesian and
frequentist paradigms can be seen as providing a powerful set of
45 Good is perhaps the most vocal proponent of a Bayes/non-Bayes compromise.
See, e.g., GOOD THINKING, supra note 20 and Good, The Interface Between
Statistics and Philosophy of Science, 3 STATISTICAL Scd. 386 (1988).
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.analytical tools for a wide range of problems and applications. This
view is not novel, and has been put forth before in the literature. C. N.
Morris captures the essence of this view in the following passage:46
[P]ractical statisticians encounter a variety of problems, and
frequency, objective Bayes, subjective Bayes, and empirical
Bayes methods provide a range of possible responses. There
can be no clear victory for any approach for all
applications; rather, we should train statisticians for a
frequency-Bayes compromise so that they can more flexibly
respond to new situations.
Adrian Smith, in advocating a pluralistic view of probability, has voiced
a similar opinion. He writes: 47
Any approach to scientific inference which seeks to
legitimize an answer in response to complex uncertainty
is... a totalitarian parody of a would-be rational human
learning process.
In general, I applaud Professor Thompson's criticism of the
positivism that has seemed to pervade much of the professional talk
about risk in recent decades. My views differ most notably from his,
however, in the sharp distinction that he draws between risk objectivism
and risk subjectivism. By creating this distinction, Thompson puts
entirely too much emphasis on the probability numbers that risk
analyses ultimately give rise to. As an alternative view, I propose a
conceptual reconsideration of the role of probability theory in the
analysis and management of risk: Instead of focusing on probability
numbers per se, probability should be viewed more as a general
framework for structuring our reasoning about risks.
If we accept the view that the structure that probability theory lends
to the risk analysis process is, on the whole, much more important than
46 Morris, Comment [on Efron's 'Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian?'], in READINGS
IN UNCERTAIN REASONING 28 (G. Shafer &J. Pearl, eds. 1990) (emphasis added).
47 Smith, Comment [on Efron's 'Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian?'], in READINGS
IN UNCERTAIN REASONING 30 (G. Shafer & J. Pearl, eds. 1990) (emphasis in
original).
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the numbers themselves, then our understanding of the various
meanings of probability is paramount to its responsible use and
application. In most situations of interest, our interpretation of
probability can influence how we interpret and approach specific
problems. To aid in this understanding, the risk analysis community
needs to focus more of its attention on simple problems that make the
conceptual and pragmatic distinctions between Bayesian and frequentist
approaches clear and understandable. Only in this way will we be able
to arrive at a unified view of the role of probability in risk analysis.
Conclusion
In this paper I have considered various issues relating to the
cognitive status of risk. Throughout the discussion, I have sought to
integrate ideas and concepts from a number of subjects, including
philosophy of science, risk analysis, and statistics. A good portion of
the discussion has centered around the various ways of approaching the
question, "When are risks real?" My own approach to this question has
been threefold in nature. First, I began by examining the various ways
in which our views of science and scientific theories influence the way
we think and reason about risk. I also discussed how these views must
ultimately be squared with the cognitive objectives of risk analysis.
Second, I argued that the principle of causality plays an essential role in
achieving the cognitive objectives of risk analysis, and, moreover, that
causality is best construed in probabilistic terms. Finally, I argued that
probability theory plays an inevitable structural role in the analysis and
management of risk, As part of this discussion, I tried to put in
perspective the traditional debate between Bayesians and frequentists,
and I offered reasons for why the debate is not as relevant to risk
analysis as is sometimes thought.
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What, then, are we left with as an answer to the question, "When
are risks real?" From the discussion above, it should be apparent that
there is no simple, unified, or all-encompassing answer to this question.
On a fundamental level, I have tried to show that there are, in fact, a
plurality of approaches to the question, and that each approach has
associated with it various philosophical and methodological
ramifications. Perhaps, in the final analysis, both political and ethical
consideration lead us to the realization that "real" risks are those risks
that are somehow worthy of consideration or action - a view that
Thompson calls normative, and one that Paul Feyerabend succinctly
captures the essence of when he says that "We decide to regard those
things as real which play an important role in the kind of life that we
prefer."48
48 P. K. FEYERABEND, 1 REALISM, RATIONALISM AND SCIENTI C METHOD xiii
(1981).
Editor's note: Professor Thompson's reply-will appear in the next issue.
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